discuss "The Blessings of Multiple Causes" (Wang and Blei, 2018). Many of their remarks are interesting. But they also claim that the paper has "foundational errors" and that its "premise is...incorrect." These claims are not substantiated. We correct the record here.
In Ogburn et al. (2019) , Ogburn, Shpitser, and Tchetgen Tchetgen (OSTT) provide a technical meditation on some of the theoretical aspects of Wang and Blei (2018) . Many of their remarks are interesting and worth further thought. However, OSTT also claim that there are "foundational errors" with the paper and that "the premise of the deconfounder is...incorrect." These claims are not substantiated. We correct the record here.1 Wang and Blei (2018) provide assumptions, theory, and algorithms for multiple causal inference. The deconfounder method involves modeling the causes, using the model to infer a substitute confounder, and then using the substitute confounder in a downstream causal inference. The deconfounder is not a black-box solution to causal inference. Rather, it's a way to use careful domain-specific modeling in the service of causal inference. In their discussion, OSTT focus on the theoretical justification of the deconfounder.
OSTT question Lemma 4, which states that the way we construct the substitute confounder means it cannot pick up mediators. OSTT invoke a series of arguments, but none is valid. (a) The identification theorems in the paper all require the consistency of substitute confounders (Definition 4). In OSTT Figure 1a , R cannot be consistently estimated in the sense of this consistency. When causes are causally dependent, there may not be a valid substitute confounder (see Section 2.6.6). (b) Z ⊥ ⊥ Y |A does not imply "no confounding." Any Z that is a deterministic function of A will satisfy this statement. E.g., the second equation in Theorem 6 satisfies the independence statement in question and there is confounding. (c) In Figures 1b and 1c , OSTT worry about single-cause mediators and colliders. The consistent 1All references refer to Wang and Blei (2018) , version 3 as of Apr 15, 2019. substitute confounder is constructed to render the causes conditionally independent. It will not be a function of just one cause, which precludes it from picking up single-cause mediators and colliders. (d) OSTT Figure 1d concerns M-bias. In that graph, the substitute confounder will pick up both U and M; no M-bias is left.
OSTT provide a counterexample of a multi-cause confounder that is separable into singlecause components; this example is excluded by the definition of multi-cause confounders in Appendix E. OSTT discuss Lemmas 1 and 2, questioning the random variable on which we used the Kallenberg construction. Definition 3 is the Kallenberg construction we intended, and it involves potential outcomes (see Eq. 39). This is how the Kallenberg construction links to ignorability. OSTT discuss a "missing assumption" in Theorem 6 that f 1 is less smooth than f 2 . This fact is sufficient for the Theorem to hold, but it is not necessary. Identification is achieved by the differentiability of f 1 , f 2 and the non-differentiability of f (Assumption 1 of Theorem 6). OSTT claim that the paper leaves open that Theorem 7 is "vacuous" because the overlap condition may be impossible to satisfy. Theorem 7 can be useful: if the substitute confounder is a linear scalar function of real-valued causes then any subsets of the causes satisfy overlap and Theorem 7 applies.
OSTT end their remarks with a reminder that all causal inference requires assumptions, and we agree. Causal inference with the deconfounder involves a number of assumptions and trade-offs. Among them are the following. (1) There can be no single-cause confounders.
(2) When we apply the deconfounder, we trade an increase in estimation variance for a reduction in confounding bias; there is no free lunch. (3) We do not recommend using the deconfounder with causally dependent causes, such as a time series.
There are many directions for further research. We need a more complete picture of identification, e.g., D'Amour (2019) makes good progress. We need to understand the finite-sample properties of the deconfounder (or, how much is lunch?). We need rigorous methods of model criticism for assessing the validity of the substitute confounder. But these are directions for research; the foundations of Wang and Blei (2018) are intact.
